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4.2 Imperfect recall
Up one levelThe doctrine of imperfect recall should be taken into account.
The courts recognise that most people do not have a photographic recollection of the visual details of a mark, but instead remember marks by their general impression, or by some significant detail. 16 This means that when considering whether two marks are sufficiently similar for citation purposes, a detailed comparison or close examination of the marks is not appropriate. Instead it should be assumed that consumers might have an “imperfect recollection” of a mark. In Rysta Ltd’s Application (1943) 60 RPC 87 at 108, Luxmoore LJ said:
It is the person who only knows the one word, and has perhaps an imperfect recollection of it, who is likely to be deceived or confused. Little assistance, therefore, is to be obtained from a meticulous comparison of the two words, letter by letter and syllable by syllable, pronounced with the clarity to be expected from a teacher of elocution. The Court must be careful to make allowance for imperfect recollection and the effect of careless pronunciation and speech on the part not only of the person seeking to buy under the trade description, but also of the shop assistant ministering to that person’s wants.
The two marks should not be compared side by side, as they will not usually be encountered in this way.17 As the European Court of Justice recently remarked in Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v Klijsen Handel BV [1999] ETMR 690, paragraph 26:
Account should be taken of the fact that the average consumer only rarely has the chance to make a direct comparison between the different marks but must place his trust in the imperfect picture of them that he has kept in his mind.
If the two marks display some differences when compared side by side, it does not necessarily follow that a citation should not be raised.
The test concerning imperfect recollection that is generally applied is that stated in Re Sandow (1914) 31 RPC 196 at 205:
The question is not whether if a person is looking at two trade marks side by side there would be a possibility of confusion; the question is whether the person who sees the proposed trade mark in the absence of the other trade mark, and in view only of his general recollection on what the nature of the other mark was, would be liable to be deceived and to think that the trade mark before him is the same as the other, of which he has a general recollection.
Footnotes
16 De Cordova & Others v Vick Chemical Company (1951) 68 RPC 103 at 106.
17 Re Sandow (1914) 31 RPC 196 at 205; De Cordova & Others v Vick Chemical Company (1951) 68 RPC 103 at 106.
